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A FUTILE ENDEAVOR: DEFINING
“SCANDALOUS” IN THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE
BRADLEY SIMON†
“I shall not today attempt . . . to define [scandalous] . . . . But I
know it when I see it.”1

INTRODUCTION
Debtors often seek the special protections offered in
bankruptcy due to the detrimental impacts of potentially
scandalous matters, which are often outside the debtor’s control.
Some file for bankruptcy after being accused of tortious or
criminal conduct,2 while others may file their bankruptcy
petitions after losing their jobs for allegedly scandalous reasons.3
†
Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 2016, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of Delaware. Special thanks to Vice
Dean Emeritus Andrew J. Simons for his invaluable guidance on this Note and
throughout all of law school. Further, I would like to acknowledge and thank
Professor Keith Sharfman for his assistance and insight on the topics of bankruptcy
and statutory interpretation. Lastly, but most importantly, I would like to thank my
mother and father, Barry and Donna Simon, and my brother, Donald Simon. You
have provided me with love, care, and the greatest support system a young man
could ever ask for. Attempting to explain how much I love you and how grateful I am
for everything you have given me would truly be a futile endeavor.
1
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring
to obscenity, the counsin of scandalous).
2
See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 2011) (filing
of the bankruptcy petition came after Archdiocese became “the subject of multiple
lawsuits seeking millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages for
sexual abuse of children by specific clergy members”); Gitto v. Worcester Telegram &
Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (filing for
corporate bankruptcy “amid allegations of financial distress and accounting
irregularities”); In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 677 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)
(filing of the company’s bankruptcy petition came shortly after former president was
“convicted and sentenced on 109 separate criminal counts involving his activities as
president of the Debtor entities”). But see SYDNEY RUTBERG, TEN CENTS ON THE
DOLLAR: THE BANKRUPTCY GAME 151 (1973) (hypothesizing that the majority of
“individual bankruptcies arise from shopping sprees at Bloomingdale’s or similar
abuses of easy credit,” but providing no support for this blanket assertion).
3
Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1050–51 (8th Cir. 2006).
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Struggling parents may file for bankruptcy to halt embarrassing
foreclosure proceedings.4
Regardless of the circumstances,
debtors frequently file to avail themselves of the automatic stay,
a powerful tool only available in bankruptcy, which ceases
collection efforts and most pending state and federal litigation.5
As a result, many nonbankruptcy related “scandalous” issues
find their way into the confines of bankruptcy court.6
The common law,7 the First Amendment,8 and United States
Supreme Court precedent9 all presage a broad presumption in
favor of transparency of public records and judicial records. The
United States Congress adopted 11 U.S.C. § 107 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) to guide bankruptcy courts in
analyzing this right-to-access,10 which predates the United States
Constitution itself.11 Section 107 codifies the common law and
places parameters on what is available to the public.12 However,

4
See, e.g., In re Nicfur-Cruz Realty Corp., 50 B.R. 162, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1985) (filing bankruptcy petition “to halt the continuation of a foreclosure action”);
Coletta v. Rubber2Gold, Inc. (In re Coletta), No. 05-88753-ast., 2011 WL 501825, at
*13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (using bankruptcy petition to “temporarily halt
the sale” of real property).
5
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). However, some matters are exempt from the
automatic stay. See id. § 362(b).
6
For example, in In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, tort claimants filed
allegations of sexual abuse in bankruptcy court. 661 F.3d at 421–22. Moreover, in In
re Phar-Mor, Inc., complaints were filed in bankruptcy court for “several strategic
reasons which would not be apparent, on its face, to a reasonable lay person: a need
to preserve some cause of action or be barred by a statute of limitations.” 191 B.R. at
679–80.
7
See, e.g., In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893); State ex rel. Colescott v.
King, 57 N.E. 535, 537 (Ind. 1900); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334
(N.J. 1879).
8
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1984).
9
See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389 (1979); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
10
11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012).
11
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981) (determining that
the right to access court records “antedates the Constitution”).
12
In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (“Section 107
codified the Supreme Court’s Nixon decision in the bankruptcy setting by
recognizing the common-law right of public access, subject to the limited exceptions
of confidential commercial information and scandalous or defamatory material.”); see
also In re Nunn, 49 B.R. 963, 964 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
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numerous courts differ widely on how to interpret § 107(b)(2),
which states that “scandalous” or “defamatory” matters should
not be publicly available.13
Interpretive approaches to § 107 are a matter of great
debate, as courts lack a uniformed approach. Even more
challenging is the fact that Congress requires courts to give
objective meaning to subjective terminology, such as the term
scandalous.14 Scandals, much like beauty, often depend on the
beholder, as scandals are often fact specific. The parties involved
and the surrounding circumstances are crucial to any analysis of
“scandalous matters.” For example, allegations that a United
States President engaged in an adulterous relationship with a
young intern would surely qualify as scandalous. Yet these same
allegations may not be scandalous to someone in the
entertainment industry. Many courts have defined the word
scandalous differently; some have defined it broadly15 and some
narrowly,16 while some have conflated scandalous with
“defamatory,” which implies falsity.17 The allegations of an
adulterous President would constitute as scandalous regardless
of truthfulness. Similarly, allegations that a law firm’s partner
engaged in an adulterous affair with a junior associate are
certainly scandalous, but hardly defamatory—if true.18
This Note addresses the various, sometimes contradictory,
approaches courts have taken in interpreting what constitutes
scandalous material under § 107(b)(2) of the Code. Part I traces
the right of public access to documents and records in bankruptcy
courts to its common-law and First Amendment origins and
13

11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b)(2).
See Helen Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 499,
504 (1950).
15
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011) (defining
scandalous matters as those which are “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the
like”).
16
Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (defining scandalous matters to be those which are
“untrue, or . . . potentially untrue and irrelevant or included within a bankruptcy
filing for an improper end”); Anthracite Capital, Inc. v. Bank of Am. (In re
Anthracite Capital, Inc.), 492 B.R. 162, 174–75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (requiring
scandalous matters to be “grossly offensive, irrelevant to the proceeding, and
submitted for an improper use”).
17
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 14.
18
Isabel Vincent & Melissa Klein, Affair and Vengeful Wife Rips Apart 9/11
Law Firm, N.Y. POST, (Nov. 9, 2014, 5:05 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/11/09/affairand-vengeful-wife-rips-apart-911-law-firm.
14
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discusses why transparency is particularly important in the
bankruptcy context. Part II addresses the split of authority
among the circuit courts regarding the appropriate way to define
scandalous, focusing on the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit’s “truthfulness and relevance” approach,19 the
Eighth Circuit’s “context-sensitive” approach,20 and the Ninth
Circuit’s “plain-meaning” approach.21 Part III explores the pros
and cons of these approaches and formulates a new rule to
resolve this interpretive split. This rule fuses the contextsensitive and plain-meaning approaches to create a hybrid rule
where courts first look at the purpose of a filed document before
analyzing whether it is “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the
like.”22 Under this approach, commonly filed papers are less
likely to be sealed under § 107(b)(2) while rare, strategic filings
are more likely to be withheld from the public.
I.

THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO VIEW AND
INSPECT COURT RECORDS

A.

The Common Law

Common-law courts in this country have long recognized a
“strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial
records.”23 This presumption extended to many public records as
well, including titles to land and documents recorded in public
offices.24 However, persons requesting to inspect records had to
show a real interest in the document.25 Mere curiosity was
generally insufficient.26

19

Gitto, 422 F.3d at 14.
Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006).
21
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011).
22
Id.
23
Robbins v. Tripp, 510 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
24
State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 57 N.E. 535, 538 (Ind. 1900).
25
Id. at 537 (“The general rule which obtained at common law was that every
person was entitled to an inspection of public records . . . provided he had an interest
in the matters to which such records related.”); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41
N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J. 1879) (permitting persons to inspect police misconduct reports
when the “documents will furnish competent evidence or necessary information”); C
v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974) (holding that “member[s] of the public ha[ve] a
right to access judicial records . . . if [they have] an interest therein for some useful
purpose”).
26
C., 320 A.2d at 723.
20
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Not all judicial records were publicly available at common
law,27 as courts refused to make documents accessible for
improper purposes,28 such as “to gratify private spite or promote
public scandal.”29 In determining whether to limit a document’s
availability, common-law courts examined and balanced various
and competing factors, such as the harm that would occur by
making a document available against the public’s interest in the
document.30 This common-law public availability right did not
extend to certain documents, such as “[d]ocumentary evidence in
the hands of a district attorney, minutes of a grand jury, [and]
evidence in a divorce action.”31
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
common-law right to access court materials in Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc.32 In Nixon, members of the media sought
access to taped recordings that were used in the “Watergate”
criminal prosecution of Richard Nixon, the former President of
the United States.33 However, based on the circumstances
surrounding the case, the Court held that “the common-law right
of access to judicial records” did not extend to the tapes in
question.34
The Nixon court held that “courts of this country recognize a
general right to inspect and copy . . . judicial records and
documents,”35 and that “[e]very court has supervisory power over
its own records and files.” 36 The Supreme Court followed this
common-law right fairly closely, holding that the publicavailability presumption “is not absolute.”37
The Court
referenced multiple examples of when access to court records
may be denied, such as when documents are filed for “improper
27
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Wis. 1966) (“[T]he
right to inspect public documents and records at common law is not absolute.”).
28
In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893) (“The judicial records of the state
should always be accessible to the people for all proper purposes.”).
29
Id. (denying access to court records because publishing “the painful, and
sometimes disgusting, details of a divorce case . . . fails to serve any useful
purpose . . . [and leads to] demoralization and corruption . . . by catering to a morbid
craving for that which is sensational and impure”).
30
Owens, 137 N.W.2d at 474.
31
Id.
32
435 U.S. 589, 607 (1978).
33
Id. at 589.
34
Id. at 608.
35
Id. at 597.
36
Id. at 598.
37
Id.
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purposes” and to expose confidential business data.38 Shortly
after Nixon, the Supreme Court added that courts maintain
“equitable powers . . . over their own processes, to prevent
abuses, oppression, and injustices,”39 which is consistent with the
ideals of the common law.40
B.

The First Amendment Right to Know About the
Administration of Justice

The right to view court records is “rooted in the public’s First
Amendment right to know about the administration of justice.”41
The Supreme Court acknowledges a First Amendment
presumption favoring transparency in criminal trials,42 while
other courts hold that “the constitutional right of access applies
to civil as well as criminal trials.”43 Much like the common law,
the constitutional right to inspect court records is not without
limitation.44 To determine whether a certain type of proceeding
should be made open to the public, the Supreme Court evaluates
two separate issues. First, the Court evaluates whether the
proceeding has traditionally been open to the public.45 Next, the
Court inquires whether public access would promote the

38

Id.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888)).
40
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W. 731, 734–
35 (Mich. 1888); In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893) (finding that judicial
records should not be made available “to gratify private spite or promote public
scandal”).
41
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d. Cir 1994).
42
William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Protective Orders in the Bankruptcy
Court: The Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code Section 107 and Its
Constitutional Implications, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67, 70 (1996); see also
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(“[A] presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under
our system of justice.”).
43
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal.
1999). See also Associated Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983) (“the public and press have a first amendment right of access to pretrial
documents.”); Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 73 (“[T]he First Amendment
presumption of public access [extends] to criminal records, civil trials, and civil
records.”).
44
Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 71.
45
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
39
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democratic process.46 Thus, proceedings are generally made open
to the public when they have been historically publicly accessible
and when accessibility benefits and furthers the democratic
system. Further, accessibility to documents or to proceedings
may be denied based on “a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the
protection of privileged information, and privacy interests of the
parties.”47 However, nondisclosure is not generally granted, as
courts must find “the denial [of public access] is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and [the remedy must be]
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”48
It is important to have transparency in the courts because
such transparency attempts to maintain the public’s confidence
in the administration of justice.49 Granting persons the ability to
inspect records upholds “the integrity, quality, and respect in our
judicial system,”50 as transparency in the courts “is an essential
feature of democratic control.”51 Broad access to court records
assures “judges perform their duties in an honest and informed
manner.”52 After all, the judiciary is merely one branch of a
government established “by the people, and answerable to the
people,”53 and making records available allows society “to keep a
watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.”54 Limiting or
outright denying the availability of court records is an extreme

46
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1985);
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604.
47
Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 72 (footnotes omitted).
48
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607. When the Supreme Court evaluates
“cases under the First Amendment presumption of public access, the standard of
review . . . is one of strict scrutiny.” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 71.
49
Allowing public access “is based on the need for federal courts . . . to have a
measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration
of justice.” Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C., No. 05 Civ. 3339(GEL), 2007 WL
273526, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007) (alteration in original).
50
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Picutres Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 83 B.R. 833,
835 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987)).
51
Anthracite Capital, Inc. v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Anthracite Capital, Inc.),
492 B.R. 162, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
52
Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to Pretrial
Information in the Federal Courts 1938–2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 820 (2007).
53
Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 68.
54
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
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measure, and nondisclosure should be “the exception rather than
the rule,”55 especially because keeping records private imposes
great costs to the judiciary system.56
C.

The Importance of Transparency in Bankruptcy

Maintaining transparency is especially important in
bankruptcy court. Rather than forcing delinquent debtors into
slavery57 or prison,58 bankruptcy offers families and corporations
the opportunity to obtain a fresh financial start either by
reorganizing debts over a set period of time59 or by liquidating
nonexempt assets and property in return for a discharge of
certain debts.60
Extending this common-law and constitutional right to make
records available in bankruptcy “fosters confidence among
creditors regarding the fairness of the bankruptcy system.”61
55
Hope ex rel. Clark v. Pearson, 38 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); see
Anthracite Capital, Inc., 492 B.R. at 171 (stating that nondisclosure is “an
extraordinary measure that is warranted only under rare circumstances”).
56
City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J.,
concurring) (limiting public access “entails great costs” because courts must use
valuable resources to keep files private).
57
See, e.g., Becky A. Vogt, State v. Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South
Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 334–35 (2001) (explaining that creditors in England
who secured judgments against debtors could have the debtor “sold into slavery”);
John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 439, 445 (2005) (tracing the history of debtor slavery to early
Rome and to American colonies).
58
See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,
and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8 (1986) (explaining
that English creditors would commonly force debtors into prisons if they could not
pay their debts); Richard E. James, Putting Fear Back Into the Law and Debtors
Back Into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 145
(2002) (tracing debtor’s prisons’ existence back to the fifth century B.C.E.); see also
CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 120–22 (Project Gutenberg) (describing the
horrors of debtor’s prisons).
59
Consumer reorganization plans may not exceed “3 years, unless the court, for
cause, approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that is
longer than 5 years.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(2) (2012).
60
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012) (discharging individual debts following
liquidation); id. § 944(b) (discharging debts of municipalities in bankruptcy);
id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (discharging debts following a Chapter 11 plan). However, not all
debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy. For example, debts incurred from fraudulent
acts or by breach of fiduciary duties are exempt from being discharged. Id. § 523.
61
Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005). Trials and hearings in adversarial proceedings commenced
in bankruptcy court must be conducted in an open court. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), which is made applicable by Federal Rule of
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Debtors in bankruptcy can access extraordinary remedies not
otherwise available in state courts, such as the ability to reject
detrimental contracts.62 At the moment a bankruptcy petition is
filed, debtors are also shielded by the automatic stay, which
ceases collection efforts and most litigation.63 To maintain
accountability, it is especially important that bankruptcy records
be publicly obtainable.
Section 107(b) was created to maintain the status quo of a
debtor’s bankruptcy estate, as the dissemination of “defamatory”
or “scandalous” information could harm the estate’s value.64
Detrimental effects of such dissemination could lead to job loss or
business regression, impairing what creditors could collect from
the debtor.65
D. The Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and
§ 107
In November 1978, just seven months after the Nixon
decision, Congress codified and expanded on the right to view
judicial records in 11 U.S.C. § 107 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978.66 Adopting § 107 indicated Congress’s “strong desire to
preserve the public’s right of access to judicial records in
bankruptcy proceedings.”67 One notable scholar has stated that
“it is possible to conclude that [§] 107 was intended to
complement and implement the Nixon decision,” since the
statute’s enactment came shortly after the Nixon decision.68
Section 107(a) states, in pertinent part, that all papers “filed in [a
bankruptcy case] and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are

Bankruptcy Procedure 9017, states that a witness’ “testimony must be taken in open
court unless” otherwise provided. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a); see FED R. BANKR. P. 9017.
62
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (stating that a trustee or a debtor-in-possession
“may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”).
63
Id.
64
David I. Cisar & Christopher J. Stroebel, A Private Moment in the Fishbowl:
Filings Under Seal in Bankruptcy Court, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J 38, 38 (2012).
65
In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 680 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (limiting
public access to maintain interested party’s “positive reputation in the local business
community”).
66
11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012).
67
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 31 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994).
68
Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 77; see also Keith Sharfman, Derivative
Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11 (2004) (arguing that pre-Code
holdings and procedure indicate congressional intent).
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public records and open to examination by an entity at
reasonable times without charge.”69 The exceptions to § 107(a)
are listed in § 107(b).70 The first exception provides that “trade
secret[s] or confidential research, development, or commercial
information” is nonaccessible.71 The second exception states that
nondisclosure of a document filed in bankruptcy is appropriate to
“protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory
matter.”72 The Code does not define the term scandalous.
There are several differences between § 107 and the
common-law right to inspect judicial records. Common-law
courts only made “judicial records” available to the public,73 while
§ 107(a) covers “all papers filed in a [bankruptcy] case.”74 Courts
have applied § 107 to many types of documents, including
discovery documents,75 creditor lists,76 investigative reports,77 and
court-ordered memoranda.78 After determining a document was
a “judicial record,” common-law courts would “balance[] the
69

11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012).
Id. § 107(b).
71
Id. § 107(b)(1).
72
Id. § 107(b)(2).
73
Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422
F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 180
(1st Cir. 2003) (“Not all documents filed with a court are considered ‘judicial
documents.’ ” (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir.
1988)); In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 430 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
common-law rule distinguishes between dispositive and non-dispositive motions,
while § 107 covers all papers filed in a bankruptcy case.”); see Stone v. Univ. of Md.
Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the First
Amendment right to inspect documents “has been extended only to particular
judicial records and documents”).
74
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 317 (1977). Section 107 (a) covers all papers filed in
the bankruptcy docket, and “the term ‘ “docket” includes the claims docket, the
proceedings docket, and all papers filed in a case.’ ” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42,
at 81–82 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 317–18 (1977)); see Gitto, 422 F.3d at 9–
10 (“[Section 107 does away] with the [common law] need to determine whether the
document at issue is a ‘judicial record’ by clarifying that, in the bankruptcy context,
the presumption of public access applies to any paper filed in a bankruptcy case, not
only to the narrower category of papers that would be considered judicial records
under the common law.”). But see Alec Ostrow, My Lips Are Sealed: Sealing Files,
Closing Courtrooms and in Camera Inspections in Bankruptcy Cases, in ANNUAL
SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 203, 206 (2004 ed.) (“[T]hings that are filed that are
not ‘paper[s],’ such as an audio or video recording of a hearing . . . are not statutorily
required to be publicly available.”).
75
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424.
76
Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2006).
77
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 5.
78
Robbins v. Tripp, 510 B.R. 61, 64 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
70
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public interest in the information against privacy interests.”79
Section 107 does not require bankruptcy courts to balance such
factors.80 Rather, when one of the § 107(b) exceptions is met,
protection must be offered.81 Further, common-law courts had
discretion to formulate exceptions to the general rule of
disclosing court documents.82 Bankruptcy courts, however, do
not have such broad discretion, as § 107(b) has only a few,
specific exceptions.83 Because § 107 addresses and resolves a
problem formerly dealt with at common law, the statute
“supplants the common law for purposes of determining public
access to papers filed in a bankruptcy case.”84 Statutes abrogate
common-law doctrines when the statute addresses and resolves
the same issue that the common law dealt with. Therefore,
“issues concerning public disclosure of documents in bankruptcy
cases should be resolved under § 107.”85
II. A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY: THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO
INTERPRETING § 107
A.

The First Circuit’s “Truthfulness and Relevance” Approach

A document’s truthfulness and relevance plays a major role
for courts analyzing § 107(b)(2) under the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit’s jurisdiction. To qualify as a
79

United States v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 190 (1st Cir. 2003).
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 10. Bankruptcy courts analyzing public-access issues under
§ 107(b)(2) “need not balance the equities of [a] case, as Congress has already
performed that task.” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 85. Additionally, “[t]he
mandatory language of § 107(b) negates the need for [common-law or First
Amendment balancing].” In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1995).
81
When one of the § 107(b) exceptions are satisfied, a court must “protect a
requesting interested party and has no discretion to deny” such motions. Video
Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d
24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994).
82
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 430 (9th Cir. 2011); Cisar &
Stroebel, supra note 64, at 38 (explaining that “courts have held that the exceptions
[to § 107(a)] are few and are narrowly construed” because of the importance of
transparency in bankruptcy).
83
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 430.
84
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 8; In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F. 3d at 430
(“[Section] 107 displaces the common law right of access in the bankruptcy
context.”). It is also worth noting that statutes abrogate common-law principles
when “the statute . . . ‘speak[s] directly’ to the question addressed by the common
law.” United States v. Tex., 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
85
In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
80
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§ 107(b)(2) exception, a paper must be completely false, possibly
false and irrelevant, or filed for an improper purpose.86 This
approach narrows scandalous matters significantly, as a showing
of truthfulness eliminates material from the protections of
§ 107(b)(2).
In Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., the First
Circuit confronted § 107(b)(2) after a corporation filed for
bankruptcy “amid allegations of financial distress and accounting
irregularities.”87 The bankruptcy court appointed an examiner to
investigate and prepare a report regarding “the existence of any
prepetition fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct,
mismanagement, or irregularity in the management and
business affairs of the Debtor.”88 A part owner and the chairman
of the corporation motioned to make the investigative report
publicly unavailable for containing “scandalous and defamatory
material within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2).”89
Members of the media opposed the motions to inhibit the report’s
availability.90
The First Circuit held that material is only worthy of “the
protections of § 107(b)(2) based on a showing that either (1) the
material is untrue, or (2) the material is potentially untrue and
irrelevant or included within a bankruptcy filing for an improper
end.”91 The court believed such an approach would make
In
nondisclosure “the exception rather than the rule.”92
formulating this rule, the First Circuit compared § 107(b)(2) with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), reasoning that the two
rules “share a common premise.”93 Like § 107(b)(2), Rule 12(f)
allows federal courts to “strike from a pleading . . . scandalous
matter.”94 Thus, both § 107(b)(2) and Rule 12(f) protect persons
and corporations from “scandalous or defamatory material
submitted under the guise of a properly pleaded [complaint].”95
86

Gitto, 422 F.3d at 5.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 14.
92
Id. at 9 (quoting Hope ex rel. Clark v. Pearson, 38 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1984)).
93
Id. at 12.
94
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
95
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 12 (quoting In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1995)).
87
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The motions to limit the availability of the investigative
report were denied by the First Circuit.96 Though the report
contained potentially untrue matters, the First Circuit found
these matters to be relevant to the underlying bankruptcy
proceeding.97 Further support for denying the motion was found
in § 1104(c) of the Code, which allows bankruptcy courts to
investigate “allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the” debtor’s
business.98 The First Circuit further held that harm to the
corporation’s reputation is insufficient to be protected by
§ 107(b)(2).99
B.

The “Context-Sensitive” Approach

The Eighth Circuit’s approach to § 107(b)(2) focuses
primarily on the reason the allegedly scandalous document was
filed. This approach allows courts to employ common sense when
determining if documents should be withheld from the public by
looking into why it appears in the bankruptcy dockets.100 Other
courts have employed a similar approach, holding that the
purpose a paper was filed “should inform the inquiry into
whether that material falls within the § 107(b)(2) exception.”101
The Eighth Circuit employed this “context-sensitive”
approach after former municipal judge Deborah Neal filed for
bankruptcy.102 Neal’s life began to fall apart after she was found
in the early hours of morning gambling at a casino.103 She would
later lose her job and be brought up on federal criminal charges
after authorities learned she received loans from attorneys.104 In
the midst of the turmoil, Neal filed for bankruptcy and was

96

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
98
11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012).
99
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 16.
100
Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006).
101
Gitto, 422 F.3d at 13.
102
Neal, 461 F.3d at 1050–51.
103
Id. at 1050.
104
Id. at 1051.
97
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required to submit a creditor list—a list of all parties she owed
money to.105 The names of many practicing attorneys appeared
on that list.106
Neal and the attorneys named on the creditor list moved to
have the list be made inaccessible to the public, and a local
newspaper opposed the motion.107 The bankruptcy court granted
Neal’s motion, but the district court overruled the bankruptcy
court and held that “there is nothing ‘scandalous’ about the
[creditor list].”108 Neal and the attoney-creditors appealed.
In ruling that the creditor list was not scandalous, and thus
not deserving of protection, the Eighth Circuit evaluated the
primary purpose the creditor list appeared in the bankruptcy
docket.109 The creditor list was ultimately made available
because its “filing had a valid purpose.”110 Submitting a creditor
list is a mandatory step debtors must abide by to receive the
“bankruptcy discharge.”111 The creditor list did not contain any
additional “information other than [that] required by law,” and
the list would only become potentially scandalous with
knowledge of the identities of the creditors and the debtor.112
Although the creditor list could impair the reputations of the
attorney-creditors, the Eighth Circuit did not believe it rose to
the level of being “[a] reservoir[] of libelous statements for press
consumption.”113

105
Id. at 1051. A creditors list is “a list of person or entities to whom [the debtor]
owes money.” Id. at 1054.
106
Id. at 1051 (“[Neal] maintained that she did not give favorable rulings in
exchange for loans. However . . . the Assistant United States Attorney . . . mentioned
that Neal may have provided favorable treatment to some of the attorney’s who
made loans to her.”). For example, a defense attorney that appeared on the creditor
list had traffic citations dismissed by the debtor-judge. Neal, 461 F.3d at 1051. A
different attorney obtained a “favorable ruling” after loaning the debtor thousands of
dollars. Id. at 1051 n.2.
107
Id. at 1050.
108
Id. at 1051.
109
Id. at 1054.
110
Cisar & Stroebel, supra note 64, at 71.
111
Neal, 461 F.3d at 1054.
112
Id. Both the debtor and creditors agreed that neither the document itself nor
its material contents were scandalous. Id.
113
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting In re
Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)).
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The Ninth Circuit’s “Plain-Meaning” Approach

Unlike the First and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
employs a “strict textual approach,” which gives bankruptcy
judges discretion to limit the availability of court papers.114 The
Ninth Circuit does not analyze why a paper was filed, its
truthfulness, or relevance when deciding whether it is to be
protected by § 107(b)(2). Rather, papers may be sealed when
they are “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the like.”115
In 2004, the Portland Archdiocese (the “Archdiocese”) filed
for bankruptcy while facing numerous allegations of clergy
members sexually abusing children.116
Upon filing for
bankruptcy, the litigation being conducted ceased pursuant to
the automatic stay, and the bankruptcy docket became “the
forum for . . . the tort claims.”117 Various personnel files of clergy
members were produced during discovery, even though many of
those clergymen had never been charged with sexual abuse.118
After the bankruptcy case was complete, the tort claimants
wished to release the documents containing the names of the
clergy members.119 The Archdiocese and various priests objected
to this request, claiming that § 107(b)(2) of the Code “precluded
the release” of those documents.120 In rejecting the Archdiocese’s
argument, the bankruptcy court did not believe the documents
were filed in the bankruptcy case for an “improper purpose.”121
Additionally, much like the First Circuit did in Gitto, the
bankruptcy court analyzed whether the documents were relevant
and “untrue” or “potentially untrue.”122
The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s interpretation, and two priests
appealed.123
114

Cisar & Stroebel, supra note 64, at 38.
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011).
116
Id. at 421.
117
Id.
118
Id. Various personnel files were produced because certain clergy members
were mentioned in the John Jay Study, “a national study of clergy abuse
commissioned by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.” Id.
119
Id. at 422.
120
Id. at 422–23.
121
Id. at 423.
122
Id. at 431.
123
Id. at 423. Circuit courts review district court rulings originating from
bankruptcy court de novo, meaning that circuit courts “do not give deference to the
district court’s determinations.” Mantz v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization (In re
Mantz), 343 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2003).
115
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the public
is permitted ‘access to litigation documents and information
produced during discovery,’ ”124 but rejected the bankruptcy
court’s analysis of § 107(b)(2).125 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis by examining the language of § 107(b)(2) and found it to
be “unambiguous.”126 Therefore, it was not necessary to go
beyond the plain meaning of the statue like the First and Eighth
Circuits had previously done. Because § 107(b)(2) does not define
scandalous,127 and because § 107 lacks significant legislative
history,128 the court turned to secondary sources to define the
term.
After consulting with the dictionary definition of
scandalous,129 the court concluded that matters qualify as
scandalous when they are “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and
the like.”130 Much like accusations of the President engaging in
an extramarital affair, allegations of priests engaging in sexual
relations with “children are most assuredly ‘scandalous’ because
they bring discredit onto the alleged perpetrators,” regardless of
their truthfulness.131 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the

124
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424 (quoting Phillips v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002)).
125
The Ninth Circuit traced the bankruptcy court’s interpretation to First and
Eighth Circuit cases, but found neither approach persuasive. Id. at 431–32.
126
Id. at 432; see Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When
the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” (quoting
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))).
127
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 432.
128
Section 107 contains hardly any legislative history, and the miniscule
amount of legislative history that exists “does little more than parrot the language of
the statute.” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 76 n.47. “The legislative history of
[§] 107 of the Bankruptcy Code provides little insight into its meaning.” Bodoh &
Morgan, supra note 42, at 76; see Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re
Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is virtually no legislative
history for § 107.”). Further, Congress failed to define scandalous in whatever
existing legislative history that exists. In re Food Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 359 B.R. 543,
555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
129
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 432 (“The Oxford English
Dictionary defines ‘scandalous’ as, among other things, ‘bringing discredit on one’s
class or position’ or ‘grossly disgraceful.’ ” (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
575 (2d ed. 2001)). But see scandalous matter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (defining such information to be improper because “it is both grossly
disgraceful (or defamatory) and irrelevant to an action or defense”).
130
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 432.
131
Id. at 433.
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bankruptcy court erred in not granting [the clergy members’]
motion” and ordered that the names of the clergymen be sealed
pursuant to § 107(b)(2).132
III. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE APPROACHES
A.

The Major Flaw With the First Circuit’s Approach

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s
approach to § 107(b)(2), requiring courts to examine a matter’s
truthfulness and relevancy, is misleading, overly broad, and
unworkable. Because the automatic stay halts the majority of
litigation when the bankruptcy petition is filed,133 many
potentially “scandalous” matters are filed for strategic purposes
or out of necessity.134 Further, many documents containing
possibly scandalous matters are mere allegations. Therefore, a
matter’s truthfulness or untruthfulness is irrelevant to qualify as
scandalous.
The First Circuit’s “truthfulness and relevance” approach
will cripple judicial economy and efficiency while further
burdening debtors. Under the First Circuit’s approach, debtors
would seemingly be forced to entertain a series of sub-trials to
prove a matter or allegation untrue or potentially untrue and
irrelevant to the underlying bankruptcy. To entertain such
matters would place a significant burden on the already heavy
dockets of those courts. Further, the “clear and unambiguous
usage of ‘or’ ” in § 107(b) indicates Congress’s intent to have

132

Id. However, the court only sealed the names of one of the two clergy
members. The clergyman that received protection was, at the time, in his
mideighties and had retired nearly twenty years earlier. Conversely, the clergyman
whose identity was released to the public continued on as a clergyman, “where his
clerical duties may bring him into contact with children.” Id. at 428. The court
released his name because of the compelling and “weighty interest in public safety
and in knowing who might sexually abuse children.” Id. at 428; see New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (holding that protecting the “physical and
psychological well-being of a minor” is a compelling state interest).
133
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
134
See, e.g., In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)
(filing document in bankruptcy court to maintain a cause of action); Roye Zur,
Preserving Estate Causes of Action for Post-Confirmation Litigation, 32 CAL. BANKR.
J. 427, 427 (2013) (failing to assert causes of action that “could or should have been
raised pre-confirmation . . . are forever barred as a result of plan confirmation”).
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defamatory and scandalous matters treated differently.135 While
truthfulness is a defense to defamatory allegations,136 false
accusations may still be scandalous.
The First Circuit’s holding is further erroneous as it is
contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. A court’s
duty, according to the Supreme Court, is “to read the statute
according to the natural and obvious import of the language,
without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the
purpose of either limiting or extending its operation.”137
Requiring a finding of truthfulness or relevancy to qualify as
scandalous is a “forced construction” the Supreme Court
explicitly prohibits.
Relevancy and truthfulness are
inappropriate to analyze whether a matter is scandalous and any
such anaylsis results in an unnecessary waste of judicial
resources.
B.

The Benefits of the “Context-Sensitive” Approach

Employing a context-sensitive approach is crucial to an
analysis of § 107(b)(2), as commonly filed papers are often less
deserving of protection. Case law indicates that documents are
worthy of protection when they are filed for rare and unusual
purposes.138 However, when the document is one typically filed
in bankruptcy court, it should be made available to the public.
Many decisions lend support to a “context-sensitive”
approach. For example, in Robbins v. Tripp, a lawyer’s courtordered memorandum, which was to detail problems with his
bankruptcy practice, was protected by § 107(b)(2) because it was
not part of a traditional adversarial proceeding.139 The Robbins
court held that the document was deserving of protection because
135
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that under § 107(b)(1), the placement of
“or” between “trade secret” and “commercial information” indicates different
requirements for the two terms).
136
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).
137
United States v. Temple, 105 U.S. 97, 99 (1881); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ”(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.
424, 430 (1981))).
138
Robbins v. Tripp, 510 B.R. 61, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014).
139
Id. at 68. The court-ordered report included “details concerning how [the
lawyer] supervised his staff . . . organized files . . . communicated with his
clients . . . and [included] impressions of the US [Trustee] regarding [the lawyer’s]
legal practice.” Id. at 64 n.1.
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the court was acting “to ensure . . . that a member of its bar was
performing at an appropriate level.”140 The report was filed for a
rare, unusual purpose, and the court ordered the lawyer to write
candidly and openly.141 Based on the extreme and unusual
purposes surrounding the report, the court ordered the entire
document be filed under seal.142 Conversely, the bankruptcy
court in In re Creighton denied the debtor-teacher’s motion to
redact her name from her bankruptcy documents, even though
she was being teased and humiliated at work.143 Although public
knowledge of the teacher’s bankruptcy filing was undeniably
embarrassing, she reaped various benefits of the bankruptcy
system, such as obtaining a discharge of certain debts.144 This is
similar to Neal v. Kansas City Star, where the former-judge’s
creditor list needed to be filed to facilitate her bankruptcy
discharge.145
C.

The Proposed Rule: Combining the “Context-Sensitive” and
“Plain-Meaning” Approach

Combining the “context-sensitive” approach with the “plainmeaning” approach would produce a hybrid rule to resolve the
current circuit split. While the plain-meaning approach is most
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it is overly broad and
could lead to mandatory documents being protected by being
potentially scandalous. Adding a context-sensitive approach,
however, will narrow what is considered worthy of § 107(b)(2)’s
protection. The teacher and former judge wishing to have
documents made publicly inaccessible to shield themselves from
embarrassment or humiliation will have their motions denied by
adding the context-sensitive gloss. The policy this rule promotes
is that debtors that benefitted from a document being filed
cannot retroactively seek to have documents made confidential to
shield themselves from the possibility of shame or
embarrassment.

140
Id. at 69. Bankruptcy courts have “the power to regulate the members of its
bar.” Id. at 68 n.4.
141
Id. at 69.
142
Id.
143
490 B.R. 240, 243–44 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2013).
144
Id. at 249.
145
461 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006).
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Why the “Plain-Meaning” Approach Is the Most Logical, But
Overly Broad

The Ninth Circuit’s “plain-meaning” approach to § 107 is the
most logical approach to § 107(b)(2) and consistent with Supreme
Court precedent. When the Supreme Court interprets a statute
containing clear and unambiguous language, “[t]he plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.’ ”146 Further, the Supreme Court has held that allowing
the plain meaning to control is the most logical and sensible way
to interpret a statute.147
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s approach in In re Roman, the
Supreme Court “customarily turn[s] to dictionaries for help in
determining whether a word in a statute has a plain or common
meaning.”148 None of the dictionary definitions of scandalous
even hint at a truthfulness or relevancy requirement.149
Requiring a showing of either is inappropriate, as courts must
presume Congress “says . . . what it means and means . . . what it
says” in a statute.150 The language used in § 107(b)(2) indicates
Congress’s intent to have scandalous matters treated differently
from defamatory ones.
However, the Ninth Circuit’s “plain-meaning approach” to
define scandalous is overly broad because it would lead to
nondisclosure of documents that should be publicly available.
The high school teacher in In re Creighton and the former judge
in In re Neal could successfully argue that the information
contained in their bankruptcy dockets are disgraceful or
146
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (alteration in
original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
147
Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 338 (1941).
148
Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen,
152 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1998); see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167,
176 (2009) (relying on the Oxford English Dictionary and Random House Dictionary
of English to define “because of”); Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S.
1, 11 (1931) (turning to the Century Dictionary to define “manufacture”); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431–32 (2000) (using Webster’s New International Dictionary
and Black’s Law Dictionary to define “fail”).
149
See supra text accompanying note 129.
150
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); see DR. SEUSS,
HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940) (“I meant what I said [a]nd I said what I
meant. . . . An elephant’s faithful [o]ne hundred per cent!”).
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shameful. High school students would lose respect for their
business teacher upon learning she filed for bankruptcy, and the
former-judge’s name and reputation would be further taininted if
her history of accepting loans from attorneys was made public.
Adding a context-sensitive approach to this analysis would
ensure that commonly filed documents, such as bankruptcy
petitions and creditor lists, are made available to the public.
2.

Narrowing the Plain-Meaning Approach with the ContextSensitive Approach

If a matter is “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the like,”
a court must next analyze why the document was filed in the
bankruptcy docket.151 Under this categorical approach, the more
common the paper is to bankruptcy, the less likely it is to be
protected by § 107(b)(2). Under the proposed rule, there are four
categories a paper could be classified as: (1) commonly filed
documents that are necessary to file for bankruptcy;
(2) documents that the Bankruptcy Code allows; (3) litigation
documents for disputed or contested matters; and (4) documents
filed for rare, unique, or strategic purposes. Courts would
scrutinize the documents based on several factors, including how
often this type of document appears in a bankruptcy proceeding,
whether it was necessary or mandatory to obtain a bankruptcy
benefit, and whether the type of document is expressly provided
for by the Code.
Commonly filed documents, such as creditor lists, and
documents that the Code specifically permits, such as
investigative-reports, are less deserving of the protections of
§ 107(b)(2). In other words, if the document filed was one that
the Code allows or if it was necessary to obtain a bankruptcy
benefit, such as the bankruptcy discharge, then the document
should be publicly available. While necessary documents would
virtually always be made available, court-ordered investigative
reports would be subjected to a slightly higher level of scrutiny,
and only compelling reasons would warrant nondisclosure. For
example, if the investigative report in Gitto Global Corporation
contained allegations of employing child laborers in sweatshops,
the report would need to be filed under seal for multiple reasons.

151

In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011).
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First, those details stretch beyond the scope of § 1104(c).152
Second, the allegations would detrimentally impact the
corporation’s ability to do business, thus impairing its ability to
repay debts.
Allegations of employing child laborers in a sweatshop in the
hypothetical investigative report would classify as litigation
documents for disputed matters, and under the proposed rule,
these types of documents would be generally withheld from the
public. Documents of this nature would be subjected to heavy
scrutiny from a court, and matters would only be made available
based on either a compelling reason or if the matter had
previously been adjudicated.153 The last category—documents
filed for rare, unique, or strategic purposes—would
presumptively never be made publicly accessible. The courtordered reflection report in Robbins v. Tripp is an example of this
fourth category, as the lawyer’s mea culpa report regarding his
poor practice was filed for a purpose wholly distinguishable from
the lawyer’s debtor-client’s bankruptcy proceeding.
D. Policy Favoring the Proposed Rule
The proposed rule is consistent with the common-law, First
Amendment, and with Supreme Court precedent. Like the
common-law and Supreme Court precedent, documents filed for
improper purposes will be withheld from the public.154 Moreover,
just as in First Amendment cases, courts may prevent public
access to the record when compelling reasons exist.155
The proposed rule’s two-step approach is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s approach to First Amendment public-access
cases. In accessibility issues cases under the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court generally allows public access when
proceedings were historically open to the public and if the
public’s presence would further the democratic process.156 The
proposed rule embraces these same principles, as bankruptcy
152

11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012).
Under the proposed rule, the hypothetical investigative report would be
made publicly available if the corporation had filed for bankruptcy after being sued
for hiring child laborers or if the corporation was already found guilty of employing
child laborers.
154
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978).
155
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
156
Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 71.
153
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courts analyzing § 107(b)(2) would analyze whether the
document is traditionally filed in bankruptcy cases. Next, the
court would see if the filing was beneficial to the debtor.
Commonly filed documents that benefit debtors will always be
made publicly available. Further, just as the Supreme Court
impedes public availability for compelling governmental
interests,157 the proposed rule grants judges discretion to
withhold documents from public consumption for compelling
reasons.
The proposed rule is also consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, as the Court would likely take a plain-meaning
approach to interpret § 107(b)(2).158 Bankruptcy courts operating
under the proposed rule would still have “supervisory power over
its own records and files” and access to documents could be
denied when the documents will be “a vehicle for improper
purposes.”159 Just like common-law courts, the proposed rule
would impede public access to documents that “gratify private
spite or promote public scandal.” 160 Documents would also be
made inaccessible under the proposed rule if they would impair a
business’s competitive standing.161 Giving bankruptcy judges
broad discretion to define scandalous benefits debtors hoping to
reorganize and payback debts, and thus also benefits creditors.
Scandalous allegations could impair a debtor’s ability to do
business, which would detrimentally impact creditors that are
owed money.
CONCLUSION
The proposed rule attempts to resolve the circuit split, but
much like Justice Potter Stewart’s problem with obscenity, it
may be impossible to precisely define the term “scandalous.” In
Jacobellis v. Ohio,162 the United States Supreme Court held that
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a motion picture containing “an explicit love scene” was not
obscene pursuant to the Court’s precedent.163 Justice Stewart
concurred with the majority’s opinion, but chose not to reaffirm
the Court’s Roth obscenity test.164 Rather, Justice Stewart
famously proclaimed he would not “attempt . . . to define
[obscenity] . . . and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.”165
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit’s definition is instructive, determinations of scandalous
will, of necessity, always be somewhat subjective. Adding the
“context-sensitive” categorical approach lends objectivity to the
§ 107(b)(2) analysis, but completely banishing subjectivity is
impossible.
While it may be impossible to come up with an ironclad
definition of scandalous, § 107(b) is nevertheless important. It
furthers the goals of judicial transparency and benefits debtors
and creditors alike.166 The common law, First Amendment, and
Supreme Court cases support “robust public access to court
records,”167 and § 107 was created to protect persons and
corporations from unwarranted publication of scandalous
matters.
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